An independent judiciary with the power to constrain the executive and legislative branches is commonly thought to be the foundation of government under the rule of law. However, it is not obvious why those with political power would ever tolerate the constraints imposed by an independent court. I o¤er an explanation for independent judicial review that is based on ongoing political competition between risk-averse parties. An independent judiciary is a mechanism through which these political competitors can enforce mutual restraint. But, support for independent judicial review is sustainable only when (1) the political system is su¢ciently competitive; (2) judicial doctrine is su¢ciently moderate; and (3) parties are both su¢ciently risk-averse and forward-looking. I employ a simple formal model to show how these variables in ‡u-ence the political sustainability of independent judicial review, and I also present the results of a preliminary empirical test which con…rms the central hypotheses.
More: What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil?
Roper: I'd cut down every law in England to do that! More: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you -where would you hide, Roper, the laws being all ‡at?
-Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons
Introduction
An independent judiciary with the authority to rule on the legality of government policy, and thereby to constrain the government's freedom of action, is taken by many to be the foundation of government under the rule of law (Tamanaha 1995; Larkins 1996; Carothers 1998; Domingo 1999) . However, this seemingly simple proposition poses a di¢cult puzzle. The fact that we say the government is constrained, or checked, by an independent court implies that the court is preventing the government from doing something that it would otherwise like to do. But the judiciary does not usually have a strong, independent base of support, let alone its own army or police force. Instead, the judiciary is created, funded, and supported by the government, and courts rely on the executive to enforce judicial rulings. Why, then, would the government accept the limits imposed by a truly independent court? Why would people with money and guns ever submit to people armed only with gavels?
I o¤er an explanation for independent judicial review based on the ongoing competition for political power between di¤erent parties or factions. An independent judiciary facilitates tacit bargains between political competitors to exercise mutual restraint and moderation -bargains that would be too di¢cult for parties to enforce on their own. However, support for independent judicial review is sustainable only when the political system is su¢ciently competitive, the judiciary is su¢ciently moderate, and the political competitors themselves are su¢ciently risk-averse and concerned with future payo¤s. Using a simple formal model, I show how these variables interact and make testable predictions regarding the conditions under which independent judicial review can be maintained.
Traditionally, the question of how the independence and authority of the court are preserved has been answered by reference to formal institutional rules, usually those found in the constitution. There are certain types of constitutional provisions -related to things like judicial selection, promotion, salary, and budget -that are thought to protect the judiciary from political interference. Indeed, much of the scholarship on judicial independence is devoted to cataloguing and analyzing these provisions (Shetreet 1985; Cappelletti 1989; American Bar Association 1999; Dickieson and Dietrich 1999) .
The study of these formal mechanisms is no doubt important for e¤ective and e¢cient institutional design. Nonetheless, looking to "parchment barriers" to explain judicial independence begs the question. Any formal provisions created by the government can be reversed -or indirectly subverted -by the same government. The fact that doing so might be illegal is irrelevant, since the question at hand is how the government can be made to comply with the law. Moreover, a great deal of research has found that formal constitutional protections are no guarantee of a truly independent judiciary (Rosenn 1987; Vyas 1992; Domingo 1999; Widner 1999) . And, other research has concluded that some countries actually give their judiciaries more independence than is strictly required by the relevant formal restrictions (Salzberger 1993) . Therefore, we must look beyond formal institutional protections to the political factors that give the government an incentive to obey the rulings of independent courts. Some scholars have suggested reasons why respecting the decisions of an independent judiciary might actually be in the interest of the government, even when doing so requires forsaking desired policies. Landes and Posner (1975) , for instance, argue that an independent judiciary makes legislative bargains more durable, and hence the current government can extract a higher "price" from interest groups for new legislation. However, this argument su¤ers from several di¢culties. First, the argument presumes that independent courts will attempt to enforce the original intent of the enacting legislature; the Landes-Posner argument cannot explain an independent court that doesn't faithfully follow this approach to legal interpretation. Second, and more importantly, judicial independence is not in fact an equilibrium in the interest group model Landes and Posner present (Boudreaux and Pritchard 1994) . In the Landes-Posner model, although each legislature's overall utility is maximized when all legislatures respect judicial independence, each legislature still has an incentive to free-ride: any individual legislature does best when it ignores judicial rulings but every subsequent legislature respects them. Third, the Landes-Posner explanation over-predicts judicial independence; indeed, it is not clear how their interest group model could account for non-independent courts.
One of the most promising suggestions for addressing these di¢culties is to model ongoing competition between a few political parties, rather than a sequence of oneperiod legislatures. This set-up allows parties to punish "defectors" who violate judicial independence, making an equilibrium that preserves judicial independence more feasible. A model that includes ongoing political competition also suggests another reason judicial independence may be desirable: independent judicial review may be a way for parties to minimize the risks associated with uncertain, and ongoing, political competition. Respecting judicial independence may require the party that currently controls the government to sacri…ce some policy objectives, but it also means that, when that party is out of power, its opponent faces similar limitations. Parties that ignore unfavorable court rulings when in power risk retaliation in kind when the political winds shift. As Thomas More reminds us in A Man For All Seasons, those same laws that frustrate our e¤orts to defeat our enemies also protect us when our enemies get the upper hand.
The argument that sustained political competition encourages compromise has been put forward as an explanation for many of the institutions associated with modern limited government (North and Weingast 1989; Weingast 1997) . The idea has been applied speci…cally to judicial independence by Ramseyer (1994) , who argues that the political logic outlined above implies that we are more likely to observe judicial independence when the political system is stable and parties alternate in power. When one party expects to be in power inde…nitely, or when the future of the competitive system as a whole is in doubt, parties have less incentive to exercise short-term restraint. This paper explores the implications of political competition for the institution of independent judicial review, using a formal model based on Ramseyer's hypothesis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the structure of the modelthe players, their utility functions, and the possible strategies. Section 3 analyzes the e¤ect of changes in four types of parameters: the level of risk-aversion for each political party; how much each party values the future relative to the present; the relative competitive strength of the parties in the system; and the political and doctrinal orientation of the judiciary. The interdependence between the latter two sets of parameters is also discussed. Section 4 considers, brie ‡y and informally, the possible results when some of the parameter values can be endogenously modi…ed by the players. Section 5 presents a cross-sectional statistical test of some of the major hypotheses. This test provides strong empirical support for the proposition that stable political competition is conducive to judicial independence. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the major hypotheses generated by the model and suggests directions for future research.
The Basic Model

Players, Utility Functions, and Order of Play
Consider a simple polity with a policy branch and a judiciary, as well as two political parties. These parties are indexed by i 2 fL; Rg, where L denotes the "Left" party and R denotes the "Right" party. The parties compete for exclusive control of the policy branch of government over a series of periods, t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g. In any given period, party i is the government party (i.e. controls the policy branch) with probability p i and is the opposition party with probability 1 ¡ p i .
The government party at time t selects a policy program; the distributional implications of this policy program are denoted by x t 2 [0; 1], where x t = 0 is the distribution most favorable to party L, and x t = 1 is the distribution most favorable to party R. The per-period payo¤s of each party i in period t are given by:
where ® i 2 (0; 1) determines parties' risk-aversion (i.e., the rate of change in their marginal utility of income) and " i;t is a random exogenous shock which has mean 0 and is independent across parties and over time. The shocks are due to the fact that each party member's utility is attributable only partially to government policy.
Government "policy" itself is so complex that it cannot be assessed accurately by observers.
Parties discount the future according to a constant discount parameter ± i 2 (0; 1).
Both parties want to maximize their discounted expected utility over the course of the game:
Let x ¤ i;t be the x t party i would select if it were in power in period t. This allows us to rewrite the expected utilities for each party, when that party is in goverment, as:
In addition to the two parties competing for control of the policy branch, the polity also includes a judiciary. The judiciary has no direct e¤ect on the choice of policy. However, in each period t the judiciary can make a declaration as to whether the policy program, and hence the value of x t , selected by the government party is legal or illegal. If the policy is declared illegal, the government may revise its policy (i.e., select a new x t before either party receives its utility payo¤ for that turn). The judiciary then rules on the legality of the revised policy. This process continues until the policy program is declared legal or the government party decides to ignore the judiciary's ruling. All the judiciary can do is make a declaration of illegality. The government can choose to modify its policy in order to get the judiciary's approval, but it need not.
Information and Communication
The government party i in period t observes x t and its own payo¤ V i;t , but does not observe V ¡i;t , the payo¤ to the opposition party. The opposition party observes V ¡i;t but does not observe x t or V i;t . As discussed above, this is because government policy is too complex for x t to be observed directly, and parties' utilities are only partly the result of government policy. Because of the problems of complexity and noise, parties cannot communicate information about their payo¤s to the other party credibly or cost-e¤ectively.
The declaration of the judiciary, however, is a public signal observed by both parties. If the government party manipulates the judiciary in order to extract a "legal" ruling for any x t value outside the [J ¡ d; J + d] interval, this manipulation will also be observed and will be treated as equivalent to an "illegal" ruling. Addi-tionally, both political parties know J and d, and the judiciary itself always observes x t accurately.
Possible Equilibrium Strategies
Though there are an in…nite number of equilibrium strategy pro…les, I will restrict attention to the three most reasonable possibilities. The …rst is the "all-or-nothing" equilibrium in which both parties always choose their most-preferred x t -that is,
In this equilibrium, the rulings of the judiciary are always ignored; independent judicial review e¤ectively does not exist. Denote this equilibrium \N oJI". The expected utilities of each party in this equilibrium are:
A second possible type of equilibrium would involve both parties using punishment strategies, conditioning on their private information, in order to enforce some more cooperative equilibrium where x ¤ L;t > 0 and x ¤ R;t < 1 when not in the punishment phase of the strategy. In general, when players have su¢cient information about other players' actions, conditional punishment strategies can be used to support any possible set of payo¤s in equililbrium as long as ± is su¢ciently close to 1 (Fudenberg initiates a punishment strategy, she risks provoking a counter-punishment, since the other player may think that she is unilaterally defecting. Substantively, this means that political parties cannot enforce mutual restraint on their own because each party can never be sure that its opponent is cooperating and that its opponent knows that it is cooperating.
The third possible equilibrium is for both parties to use punishment strategies conditioning on the judiciary's rulings. That is, each party, when in government, will cooperate by only selecting x t values ruled legal by the judiciary, so long as the other party does the same. If one party defects, selecting a policy that the judiciary rules illegal, the other party initiates a pubishment phase in which it always picks its ideal point for a duration su¢cient to o¤set the other party's gain from its initial defection. It is clear that, in this equilibrium, parties would always select the
Denote this equilibrium, in which the policy branch accepts the legal constraints imposed by an independent judiciary, \JI". The expected utilities of each party, when in government, from playing this equilibrium are:
Conditions for Judicial Independence
In order for J I to be a sustainable equilibrium, it must be the case that EU L (govjJ I) > EU L (govjN oJI) and EU R (govjJI) > EU R (govjN oJ I). If it is the case that at least one party, when in government, prefers N oJI, then judicial independence is not sustainable. However, we assume that if JI is sustainable, it will be achieved. The conditions under which J I is always preferred to N oJI by each of the parties can be written:
For ease of reference, denote the left-hand sides of the …nal inequalities in Equations (1) and (2) Y L and Y R , respectively. That is,
Here, Y i measures the attractiveness of judicial independence to party i, and
Comparative Statics Analysis
We are interested in learning how the values of the various parameters a¤ect the attractiveness of judicial independence to the parties. Speci…cally, we want to know the e¤ect of parties' levels of risk aversion (® L and ® R ), how much they value future payo¤s relative to present payo¤s (± L and ± R ), the competitiveness of the political system (p L ), the political slant of the judiciary (J ), and the level of judicial deference (d). For each of these variables, the analysis can be done simply by taking the derivative of each Y i with respect to the variable of interest.
Risk Aversion
Recall that ® i measures party i's risk aversion; lower values of ® i imply higher levels of risk aversion. To examine the e¤ect of this parameter on the attractiveness of judicial independence we take the derivatives:
Because the derivatives are negative, judicial independence becomes more attractive as parties become more risk averse. This makes intuitive sense, since the lower variability in policy outcomes associated with the J I equilibrium is more valuable to highly risk-averse parties.
The Shadow of the Future
The derivatives of Y L and Y R with respect to discount parameters ± L and ± R , respectively, are:
This implies that as a party places relatively more weight on future payo¤s, the more attractive judicial independence becomes. Again, the logic underlying this result is quite intuitive. As in most repeated games, a long shadow of the future makes cooperation easier. If the ± value of the government party is too low, that party is not willing to give up the extra utility it could get immediately by subverting judicial independence in exchange for the longer-term bene…ts of cooperation.
Substantively, a low value of ± could correspond to myopia on the part of the party or its leaders, or it may simply mean that party members care less about the future than the present. Parties are especially likely to have lower ± values if the political environment is highly unstable, as players are less sure that they will be around to compete in future periods.
Additionally, note that even if the party rank-and-…le are concerned with the long term, it may still be the case that the government leaders prefer to achieve very favorable x t values immediately, either because they don't expect to be leaders in future periods or because they can somehow use short-term gains to maintain their position and undermine rivals for leadership. In this case, the party may behave as if its ± is relatively lower if the rank-and-…le cannot adequately discipline the leaders.
These internal party dynamics are not modelled here, but they should be kept in mind when considering the substantive interpretation of the ± parameter.
Political Competitiveness
One of the most important questions to consider is how the attractiveness of judicial independence relates to the competitiveness of the political system. Note that here, in contrast to ® i and ± i , the same parameter a¤ects both Y L and Y R . The derivatives of both are taken with respect to p L , the probability that party L is the government party in any given turn (recalling that
Thus, judicial independence becomes less attractive to parties as they become more successful in political competition. But, of course, in this model political competitiveness is zero-sum. If, for example, party L becomes more competitive, judicial independence becomes less attractive to party L and more attractive to party R. This suggests an important conclusion: in order for judicial independence to be sustained, political competition needs to be at some intermediate level.
If the system becomes too favorable to either party, that party will abandon its support for the J I equilibrium because the compromise is no longer worth it. We can conclude that, in general, systems that exhibit a high degree of political competition and alternation in power are more likely to exhibit judicial independence than those in which one party has a virtual lock on government authority. This argument is subject to important quali…cations, discussed below in section 3.5.
Judicial Policy Slant
The parameter J determines the location of the range of legal values for x t . High values of J mean that the legal interval is closer to the preferences of party R, while lower J values mean that this interval is closer to party L's prefereces. (Again, this model is agnostic on the question of whether the location of J is the result of judges' partisan political a¢liation or is merely the unintended result of a particular approach to legal interpretation.) Like the political competiveness parameter p L , J a¤ects Y L and Y R simultaneously. The derivatives are:
These results imply that the more the judiciary slants toward a party's preferred position, the more attractive judicial independence is to that party. But, as was the case with political competitiveness, there is a direct, zero-sum trade-o¤ between how much the judiciary favors party L and how much it favors party R. Again, we can conclude substantively that the judiciary cannot lean too much in either direction or else at least one party will prefer the N oJ I equilibrium. For judicial independence to be sustainable, J cannot be too high or too low, but must be in some intermediate region. The location of this region depends in part on p L :
Relationship Between Political Competitiveness and Judicial Policy Slant
We have already shown that parties become more inclined to favor judicial independence when they are politically weak and when they are favored by the judiciary.
But, because these variables are zero-sum from the perspective of the parties, it is impossible to change J or p i without making judicial independence more attractive to one party and less attractive to the other. Furthermore, these two variables are related in an important way. We can see the nature of the relationship by taking the cross-partial derivatives:
These results show how the e¤ect of the parameters p L and J are linked. As p L increases (that is, as the political system becomes more favorable to party L), a mar- judicial independence is to be maintained. In other words, if the judiciary exhibits a strong political slant (which for some reason it doesn't modify endogenously to protect its own authority), then judicial independence is more likely when the party toward which the judiciary leans also tends to win most of the contests for power.
So, it may be that some judicial "bias" in favor of a more powerful political party is not just a by-product of the same social or cultural factors that made that party powerful in the …rst place, or simply evidence that the judiciary is manipulated or stacked with political appointees. Rather, the model here suggests that such "bias" may be necessary in order for the judiciary to preserve its authority. Indeed, as p L approaches 1, the only values of J that can satisfy Equations (1) and (2) are extremely close to 0, and vice versa. So, when one party or ruling clique dominates the political system, we expect either a judiciary with preferences almost identical to the ruling party or no real independent judiciary at all.
However, note that this is a limiting case. If party L is stronger than party R, but not overwhelmingly dominant, then the range of sustainable J values will still be greater than 0, as can be seen in the above example. Even when one party is strong enough that an independent judiciary will have to slant at least somewhat in its direction, the judiciary will still be more moderate than that party as long as the stronger party isn't overwhelmingly dominant.
Judicial Deference
The …nal parameter to consider is d, which measures the size of the interval of "legal" 
Note that, unlike the derivatives of the other parameters analyzed above, these derivatives are not constrained to be positive or negative. Thus, whether marginal increases in d increase or decrease the attractiveness of J I to parties L and R depends on the value of the other parameters. Speci…cally,
From these equations we can see that an increasingly deferential judiciary is more likely to enhance the attractiveness of judicial independence to a party when that party has a low discount parameter, when it does well in political competition, and when the judiciary tends to slant away from its preferred x t . Note also that d itself is one of the determinants of the sign on Again, a numerical example may help illustrate the principle at work. Assume and that place less of a value on future payo¤s. This suggests why some parties tend to support greater levels of judicial deference than others. It may have less to do with ideology as such than with a rational calculation of interests based on political reality.
Endogenous Manipulation of Judicial Doctrine
So far, we have treated the parameters of the model as exogenous. We now consider, informally, how the three actors in the game -the two parties and the judiciarymight try to manipulate parameters J and d, if they were able to do so.
The preferences of the two parties have already been de…ned. When there are at least some parameter values for which J I is preferred by both parties, then we know that each party would like to manipulate the model parameters to achieve judicial independence, but on terms as favorable as possible to itself. As for the preferences of the judiciary, we can assume that its primary concern is with maintaining its authority -that is, with making sure that JI is sustained in equilibrium. Secondarily, we will presume that the judiciary may have some preference over political outcomesthough again, this may be "accidental", rather than the product of overt, politicallymotivated "activism".
What are some of the possible implications of these presumptions? First, if the judiciary can adjust J and d, then we can assume that, if at least one possible J I equilibrium exists, it will be achieved. If the judiciary, for example, slants too far "right", it can shift leftwards until J I is feasible in equilibrium. Once the judiciary's primary goal -securing its independent authority -is achieved, its choice of political orientation will be determined by its jurisprudence or its political preferences. Note that, since political parties are aware of this, each political party has an incentive to try to stack the judiciary such that the "natural" judicial preference is very close to the party's own ideal point. Then, the judiciary will make the minimum necessary adjustment to make judicial independence palatable to both parties. The manipulating party will thus achieve judicial independence on terms most favorable to itself.
However, if the judiciary is too far left or right and for some reason can't or won't adjust, we would expect both parties -even the one favored by the judiciary's political slant -to support changes that would make the judiciary more moderate.
For example, imagine that the party R is dominant politically and the judiciary leans far to the right. Then, an exogenous shock causes parties L and R to be more evenly matched, such that the current judicial slant makes judicial independence unsustainable. If the judiciary doesn't adjust on its own, party R will support changes that move the judiciary leftwards, just enough so that mutual support for judicial independence is achieved.
In addition, it is worth recalling here the results for the parameter d. Parties not favored by the court, and parties that do well in political competition, are more likely to favor an expansion of judicial deference, while those parties that are favored by the court, and those that do poorly in political competition, are more likely to support a more restrictive judicial doctrine.
These conjectures lead to the following tentative predictions. First, we expect that, when judicial independence is at all feasible given the exogenous parameters p i , ® i , and ± i , it will be achieved. Second, we expect the judiciary to modify its doctrine in order to preserve its independence. Third, we expect parties, when given the opportunity, to try to stack the court with politically-favorable judges. However, fourth, we expect those judges to moderate their position once in o¢ce. Fifth, we expect the strongest support for an expansive judicial doctrine from politically strong parties and/or judicially-unfavored parties. On the other hand, we expect strong support for a restrictive doctrine from politically weak and/or judicially-favored parties.
Two important caveats are in order. First, the fact that players would like to adjust parameters in a certain way does not imply that they will always be able to.
There may be obstacles that prevent such optimal adjustments, or these adjustments may be costly. Cost functions for e¤ecting parameter changes are not modeled explicitly here. Second, the fact that parties might try to manipulate J and d while in o¢ce may alter all players' expected utility calculations, and hence may have an e¤ect on equilibrium results. Fully incorporating these factors into the model is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, the hypotheses laid out above are only provisional.
Empirical Analysis
A comprehensive emprical assessment of all the model's predictions is not feasible at this stage, due to the lack of valid and reliable data on several of the relevant variables. Nonetheless, some preliminary empirical evaluation is possible. Using 1995 data for 153 countries, I test the hypotheses that political competition and political stability make judicial independence more likely, controlling for income, education, and cultural background. The results of the statistical tests strongly support these hypotheses.
Dependent Variable Data
There is no direct way to measure objectively the level of independence enjoyed by the judiciary. But, the U.S. State Department's Human Rights Country Reports provide a standardized, relatively comprehensive subjective assessment of the state of judicial independence in over 180 countries. I use the 1995 Human Rights Country Reports to generate a three-point ordinal Judicial Independence Index. Countries are coded "2" if, according to the report, judicial independence is respected in practice by the government, and they are coded "0" if the report states the judiciary is subservient to the executive or where executive interference with the judiciary is described as "extensive" or "frequent". Ambiguous cases -where, for example, there is "occasional" executive interference, or where the judiciary's powers are signi…cantly limited -are coded "1". The United States was coded "2", although it is not included in the Human Rights Country Reports. Other countries for which the Human Rights Country
Reports did not contain adequate information were dropped from the dataset. Of the remaining 183 countries, 65 scored "0", 44 scored "1", and 74 scored "2" on the Judicial Independence Index.
Independent Variable Data: Political Competition
In order to test the hypothesis that greater political competitiveness increases the likelihood that the judiciary will be independent, a variable that proxies for parties' subjective assessments of their probability of controling the government is needed.
I use data on political parties' competitive performance, available from the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2000) , to construct a variable, 
Independent Variable Data: Democratic Stability
To proxy for parties' discount parameters, I use the number of years of continuous democratic political competition, as of 1995. The theory behind using this measure is that a history of stable political competition is a good predictor of a future of stable political competition. Hence, political parties in a country with a history of continuous institutionalized democracy are more likely to have higher ± values, and therefore the model predicts judicial independence will be more likely in such a country. I construct the variable Democratic Stability using the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2000). First, I take the total number of years, up to and including 1995, that each country in the sample has received a score of 7 or higher on Polity IV's 0-10 Institutionalized Democracy scale, and denote this total "Y rsDemoc". (The Polity IV dataset contains data dating back to 1800.) The variable Democratic Stability is equal to ln (1 + Y rsDemoc). Data on this variable was available for 157 of the original 183 countries. (Again, the dropped countries tended to be very small.)
The values of the Democratic Stability variable ranged from 0 (89 countries) to 5:283
(United States), with a mean of 1:241 and a standard deviation of 1:630. The data was heavily skewed toward the lower end of the scale; 104 countries in the sample had fewer than …ve years of continuous democracy.
Because this variable is intended to pick up the e¤ects of continuous, stable political competition, rather than the presense or absense of democracy in 1995, I also include a dummy variable, Democracy, which takes a value of "1" if the country scored 7 or higher on the Polity IV Institutionalized Democracy scale in 1995 and a value of "0" otherwise. Sixty-eight countries in the sample got a Democracy score of 1, while 89 scored 0. This variable is expected to be highly correlated with Political
Competition; a comparison of the signi…cance of these variables should reveal whether the presense of a formal democratic structure or an actual history of alternation in power is the more important predictor of judicial independence.
Control Variables
To correct for potential omitted variable bias, data on income and education are also included. Speci…cally, I used the natural log of the 1995 per capita gross domestic product (corrected for purchasing power parity) and the natural log of the adult literacy rate, both available from the 1998 Human Development Report (UNDP 1998).
Additionally, I constructed a dummy variable that takes a value of "1" if the country in question is "Western" (a category that includes the countries of Western Europe plus the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) and a value of "0" countries in the original sample were categorized as "Western".
Regression Results
Using an ordered probit speci…cation, as is appropriate for an ordinal, categorical dependent variable (Greene 1997) , I estimate three di¤erent models. In all three, the dependent variable is the Judicial Indepedence Index score. In the …rst model, I include only the explanatory variables of interest -Political Competition and Democratic Stability -and the Democracy control. In the second model I control for income and education. In the third, I also control for whether the country is "Western". The results are presented in Table 1 . and Democracy = 1), the probability that Judicial Indepedence Index equals 0 is 0:311, the probability that it equals 1 is 0:384, and the probability that it equals 2 is 0:305. When, with all other variables held constant at their means, Political
Competition is increased by one standard deviation from its mean value to 0:454, the ***=99% signi…cance; **=95% signi…cance; *=90% signi…cance probability that Judicial Indepedence Index = 0 decreases to 0:218 and the probability that Judicial Indepedence Index = 2 increases to 0:412. When Political Competition is decreased by one standard deviation from its mean to 0:062, the probability that Judicial Indepedence Index = 0 jumps to 0:419 while the probability that Judicial Indepedence Index = 2 drops to 0:213. Thus, the e¤ect of political competition on the probability that a country will have a fully independent judiciary is substantial.
Similarly large e¤ects obtain for Democratic Stability. An increase by one standard deviation from its mean of 1:241 to 2:871 (all other variables …xed as before)
increases the probability that the Judicial Indepedence Index = 2 from 0:305 to 0:551.
Decreasing the value of Democratic Stability to 0:693 (the minimum possible value when Democracy = 1) with all other variables at their means causes this probability to drop to 0:235. Table 2 shows the predicted probabilities that the Judicial Indepedence Index = 2 with di¤erent values of Political Competition and Democratic Stability. The table demonstrates that variation in the level of political competition and the stability of the democratic system can have an enormous impact on the probability that a country will have an independent judiciary.
These results strongly support the hypotheses that political competition and stability foster independent judicial review. However, it is important to note three important caveats. First, the dependent variable data is derived from subjective evaluations made by U.S. State Department o¢cials, and if their subjective assess- Second, the validity of both explanatory variables of interest hinges on the assumption that past history is a good proxy for subjective assessments of future probabilities.
While this assumption seems reasonable as a general rule and has been used in similar research designs (Clague et al. 1993) , it can lead to inaccurate characterization of cases where there has been a recent change in relevant features of the political context. Third, political competition and democratic stability may be endogenous, i.e. judicial independence may foster stable democratic competition. In the absense of reliable instrumental variables (which would have to be correlated with political competition and/or democratic stability but not judicial independence) I cannot rule out the possibility of reverse or reciprocal causation. More sophisticated and comprehensive empirical testing will require more and better data. Nonetheless, the consistency of the empirical results with the predictions of the model increases our con…dence that the model is accurate.
Summary of Major Conclusions
The model developed in this paper, though parsimonious, generates a number of explicit, empirically testable predictions regarding several aspects of the relationship between the independent judiciary, judicial doctrine, and the competitive political system. The main …ndings are re-stated here:
² Independent judicial review is valuable to political competitors when those competitors would prefer to exercise mutual restraint, but the necessary monitoring and enforcement of this restraint are not possible or are prohibitively costly.
² Systemic political instability is likely to reduce the attractiveness of judicial independence because parties will assign less weight to the future if they're less sure they'll be around to compete in future periods. Similarly, judicial independence is more likely when leaders are insulated from pressures to produce immediate policy results for themselves or their constituencies. Empirical evidence is consistent with the prediction that stable political competition is likely to encourage judicial independence.
² Judicial independence is more likely when the political system is competitive.
Parties …nd judicial independence less attractive as they become more com-petitively successful, and there is a direct trade-o¤ between the relative competitiveness of the di¤erent parties. The prediction that political competition makes judicial independence more likely …nds strong support in the empirical data.
² The judiciary's political orientation is constrained by the nature of political competition. Speci…cally, the range of judicial political slants compatible with judicial independence is skewed in the direction of the more competitively successful party. If there is a dominant party, the judiciary will either exhibit preferences very similar to that party or be marginalized. In less extreme cases, an independent judiciary is more likely to slant toward the more powerful party but it will still be more moderate than that party.
² An independent judiciary will be less attractive to all parties when it adopts a doctrine that is either too ‡exible or too expansive. Insofar as the judiciary has control over its own doctrine, we expect that it would adjust accordingly and adopt an intermediate level of deference.
² To the extent that parties have the ability to manipulate the expansiveness of judicial doctrine, we expect politically-strong and judicially-unfavored parties to promote an expansive judicial doctrine, whereas politically-weak and judiciallyfavored parties should promote a more restrictive doctrine.
² If the judiciary has control over its political orientation, and is expected to adjust its orientation in order to preserve its independence, then political parties will try to shift the court's "natural" preferences as much as possible toward their own ideal points. But they, and we, expect the judiciary to moderate its position.
² If the judiciary does not self-adjust -if it gets "stuck" so that it is too favorable to one party for judicial independence to be maintained -we expect even the favored party to try to support changes that make the judiciary's orientation more moderate. While constitutional theorists and political philosophers have constructed a variety of normative and interpretive theories to reconcile the apparent con ‡ict between the ideals of democracy and constitutionalism (Bickel 1962; Ely 1980; Homes 1988) , the model developed in this paper suggests that, whatever the possible normative tension between democracy and independent judicial review, there is a positive explanation for the close association between these institutions. Speci…cally, independent judicial review serves a valuable insurance function for competitors in a stable democracy. In this case, philosophical consistency may be less important, as a practical matter, than functional complementarity.
Finally, the model presented here has implications not only for the political viability of judicial review, but also for the nature of judicial doctrine and jurisprudence.
The model shows that political factors a¤ect the nature of the judiciary that can be sustained, in terms of both political orientation and doctrine. Thus, this model is consistent with other research that suggests judicial doctrine is shaped not only by the attitudes of judges but by political calculations (Ferejohn and Weingast 1992; McNollGast 1995) . Similarly, this perspective suggests that political battles over the proper role of the judiciary, often seen as philosophically or ideologically motivated, can be reinterpreted as re ‡ecting the relative political positions of di¤erent factions.
The model presented here is incomplete. It must be extended to incorporate additional complexity, and its predictions must be tested for robustness to alternate speci…cations. For example, the current model only considers two parties and a single policy dimension. A useful extension would examine the implications of allowing three or more competitors, and two or more relevant policy dimensions. Further research is also needed to explore the conditions under which parties will be able to coordinate on a moderate equilibrium without the judicial signaling mechanism. The model here took as an assumption that self-enforced cooperative equilibrium would be too di¢culte or prohibitively expensive; a useful extension would establish the conditions under which this is in fact the case. In addition, the model has only talked about the "government" and the judiciary, without subdividing the former into its constituent branches -executive, legislative, administrative, etc. -and incorporating the possibility that di¤erent factions could control di¤erent branches. A more formal treatment of the possibility of endogenous manipulation of parameter values is also needed. And, of course, rigorous empirical testing will require better data.
Nonetheless, despite these limitations, this model may serve as a useful foundation for more sophisticated theoretical and empirical analyses, and will contribute to understanding of the political foundations of judicial independence. Moreover, while this model deals speci…cally with judicial review, the principles underlying the analysis may have a much more general application. A similar logic might be used to explain the sources of the political power of other agents and institutions that lack direct control over the means of coercion.
